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Abstract 
 
Using a sample of 167 mergers during the period 1990-2002 involving 544 firms either 
as merging firms or competitors, we contrast a measure of the merger’s profitability 
based on event studies with one based on accounting data. We find positive and 
significant correlations between them when using a long window around the 
announcement date and, for rivals, in case of anticompetitive mergers. 
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1. Introduction 
The assessment of the competitive effects of large mergers is one of the most important tasks for anti-
trust authorities worldwide. Unfortunately, these effects are not observed at the time when the 
authority must make its decision to allow or block the merger or let the merger through with remedies. 
In principle, stock markets could help predicting the future profitability, since they are forward 
looking. However, many economists, in particular industrial organization economists, are skeptical 
about the markets’ ability to correctly anticipate mergers’ competitive effects. Thus, the pioneering 
efforts of Eckbo (1983) have not been widely applied in merger analysis.  
This paper tries to close the gap between the finance and industrial organization literatures by  
estimating (1) (ex ante) announcement effects of mergers on both merging and rival firms, (2) (ex 
post) balance sheet profit effects of these mergers on merging and rival firms up to five years post-
mergers, and (3) comparing these estimates by correlation analysis.  
 
2. Measuring Profitability 
2.1. Event Studies 
Under the assumptions of efficient markets and rational expectations, the market model predicts that 
firm i’s stock return at time t ( itR ) is proportional to a market return ( itmtit RR εβα ++= ). We 
estimate the market model over 240 trading days, starting 50 days prior to the announcement day. We 
use the estimated values for the model’s parameters to predict what firm i’s stock price would have 
been, had the merger not been announced ( itRˆ ). For firm i, we then calculate the abnormal return 
around the mergers’ announcement day t (ARi,t) as: )ˆˆ(ˆ mtitititit RRRRAR βα +−=−= . The 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over an event window (m,n) is then defined to be: 
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= ∑ . We calculate these measures for each of the merging rival firms.1 
 
2.2. Ex-post Profitability 
We use the methodology of Gugler et al. (2003) to predict the merger’s ex post profit effects. The 
method compares reported profit levels post merger with predicted profit levels in the absence of the 
merger. Our counterfactual is the development of profits and total assets of the median firm (in terms 
of profitability) in the same 3-digit industry as the merging firms or their rivals operate. We used a 
number of other counterfactuals, such as similar size or geographical regions but none changed our 
results significantly. 
                                                 
1 See Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2006) for a description of the literature, the data, and a more complete description of the 
methodology.   
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The projected change in the returns on the acquirer’s assets from year t-1 to t+n are defined as: 
1
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, where ΠIGt+n are the median firm’s (income statement) profits and KIDt+n 
are the median firm’s assets both in the same 3-digit industry of the acquired company in year t+n. 
We define ∆ID t,t+n for the acquired firm’s industry analogously to ∆IG t-1,t+n. The predicted profits of 
the combined company M in year t+n is then:  
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where ΠGt+n (ΠDt) are the profits and KGt+n (KDt) are the assets of the acquiring (acquired) company in 
year t+n (t).  
The same logic can be applied to the rivals. In fact, antitrust markets are different than 
industries based on the SIC classification. The advantage of our database is that we have information 
on the merging firms’ effective rivals in the involved product markets. These firms are not a good 
counterfactual, since they are influenced by the merger just as much as the merging firms are. 
However, the merger should not strongly affect the rest of the industry, which makes the 3-digit SIC 
classification a good counterfactual for the merger, once we exclude the merging and rivals firms. We 
can, hence, get a measure of the projected change in the returns and of the predicted profit for the 
rivals in absence of the merger, which is something novel in the literature.  
Our measure of firm i's merger effect (i=merging entity or rivals) is then the difference 
between actual (observed) profits in year t+n and the predicted profits: predictednit
actual
nit
effect
nit +++ ∆Π−∆Π=∆Π  
 
3. The Data and Correlations 
Our sample consists of 167 concentrations that were analyzed by the European Commission (EC) 
during the period 1990-2002.2 We identify 544 different firms either as merging or as rival firms. The 
relevant markets and, thus, rivals are defined in the EC reports. 
 Table 1 reports the median values for the CARs based on different event windows and the 
profitability effects ( ,
effect
i t n+∆Π ) for merging firms and rivals up to five years after the merger. In the 
full sample, all median values (with the possible exception for CAR (2,2) for rivals, which is close to 
zero) have the same sign.   
 Table 2 reports pairwise correlations among CARs and profitability effects. For merging 
firms, the correlation coefficients between CAR (50, 5) and firms’ profit are always positive and 
mostly significant. The profit effects four years after the merger seem to be very well captured by all 
                                                 
2 Our sample includes almost all phase II mergers completed by the EU by the end of 2001, and a randomly matched 
sample of phase I cases, which run up to June 2002. See Duso, Neven, and Röller (2006). 
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measures of abnormal returns. However, CARs based on long windows seem to perform better. The 
picture is different for rivals: CARs based on short windows produce very misleading results, since 
they are negatively and significantly correlated to the real profit effects. However, for rivals the CARs 
based on long windows (30 or 55 days) also seem to capture very well the long term merger’s profit 
effects. 
 Table 3 splits the sample into pro and anticompetitive mergers.3 Interestingly, the market 
correctly anticipates anti-competitive mergers when using long pre-announcement periods (25 to 50 
days), as witnessed by the large and significant correlation coefficients for rivals up to five years post 
merger. Also, the market predicts merging firms’ rents stemming from increased efficiencies 
(procompetitive mergers) more precisely than those stemming from an increase in market power 
(anticompetitive mergers). 
 
4. Conclusions  
This paper establishes empirical evidence that the event study methodology is useful for the 
competitive analysis of mergers. In particular, for a large sample of EU mergers during the period 
1990-2002, we show that abnormal returns and ex post profitability of mergers are positively and 
significantly correlated. This is particularly true when using long event windows and, for rivals, in 
anti-competitive mergers. 
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Table 1: Preliminary Statistics 
 
 MERGING FIRMS 
 CAR(2,2) CAR(25,5) CAR(50,5) , 1
effect
M t+∆Π , 2effectM t+∆Π , 3effectM t+∆Π  , 4effectM t+∆Π  , 5effectM t+∆Π  
Median 9.229 2.359 29.742 62.260 103.521 108.986 203.217 202.620 
Obs. 125 126 127 131 132 101 86 66 
 RIVALS 
 CAR(2,2) CAR(25,5) CAR(50,5) ,
effect
i t n+∆Π  ,effecti t n+∆Π  ,effecti t n+∆Π  ,effecti t n+∆Π  ,effecti t n+∆Π  
Median -0.571 5.666 4.528 69.256 53.328 74.230 103.467 242.653 
Obs. 314 313 311 321 327 221 174 143 
Notes: All values are expressed in Million US$. The CAR(m,n) variables represent the cumulative abnormal returns over the 
window spanning from m days before the event to n days after the event. The ,
effect
i t n+∆Π  variables represent the aggregated profit 
change from one year before the merger to n years after the merger if compared to the median firm in the same SIC3 industry.  
  
Table 2: Pairwise Correlations: all mergers 
 MERGING FIRMS RIVALS 
 CAR(1,1) CAR(2,2) CAR(5,5) CAR(25,5) CAR(50,5) CAR(1,1) CAR(2,2) CAR(5,5) CAR(25,5) CAR(50,5)
, 1
effect
i t+∆Π  -0.1069 0.0144 -0.0357  0.1274 0.1643 -0.1752 0.0953 -0.0662 0.0690 0.1648 
  0.1870 0.8598  0.6599  0.1131 0.0411**  0.0005*** 0.0571** 0.1878 0.1703 0.0010***
, 2
effect
i t+∆Π  -0.0314 0.1281 -0.0537  0.1289 0.2031 -0.2045 -0.1488 -0.0752 -0.0133 0.0611 
  0.7284 0.1546  0.5519  0.1488 0.0225**  0.0003*** 0.0082*** 0.1855 0.8150 0.2814 
, 3
effect
i t+∆Π  -0.0196 0.0013  0.0210  0.2022 0.2096 -0.2487 0.0024 -0.0983 0.0856 0.0617 
  0.8479 0.9900  0.8375  0.0448 0.0373**  0.0002*** 0.9715 0.1462 0.2057 0.3647 
, 4
effect
i t+∆Π   0.3443 0.5408  0.0966  0.1601 0.4778 -0.1521 -0.1556 -0.0462 0.1802 0.0818 
  0.0013*** 0.0000***  0.3848  0.1459 0.0000***  0.0464** 0.0415** 0.5474 0.0180** 0.2862 
, 5
effect
i t+∆Π   0.1947 0.2882  0.1894  0.1444 0.0926 -0.2539 -0.1770 0.0615 0.4556 0.1837 
  0.1201 0.0199**  0.1309  0.2511 0.4630  0.0025*** 0.0364** 0.4704 0.0000*** 0.0298** 
Notes: We report pairwise correlation coefficients (first row) as well as p-values (second row).***, **, * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 3: Pairwise Correlations: Mergers split into pro- and anti-competitive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: We report pairwise correlation coefficients (first row) as well as p-values (second row).***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level respectively. A merger is defined to be anticompetitive (procompetitive) if the aggregated cumulative abnormal returns of the 
rivals - CAR(25,5) - are positive (negative). The sample includes all observations for which the variable , 2
effect
i t+∆Π was not missing. 
 MERGING FIRMS 
 PROCOMPETITIVE ANTICOMPETITIVE 
 CAR(1,1) CAR(2,2) CAR(5,5) CAR(25,5) CAR(50,5) CAR(1,1) CAR(2,2) CAR(5,5) CAR(25,5) CAR(50,5) 
-0.1711  0.0434  0.0355  0.1252  0.1732  0.0494 -0.0254 -0.1132  0.1601  0.1697 
, 1
effect
i t+∆Π   0.1451  0.7135  0.7639  0.2810  0.1401  0.6638  0.8243  0.3175  0.1560  0.1299 
 0.0608  0.2716  0.0655  0.1669  0.3442 -0.1242  0.0042 -0.1626  0.1104  0.1115 
, 2
effect
i t+∆Π   0.6304  0.0286**  0.6040  0.1771  0.0050  0.3446  0.9748  0.2145  0.4012  0.3925 
-0.0845 -0.0331 -0.0486  0.2177  0.1635  0.1158  0.0688  0.1085  0.1993  0.2492 
, 3
effect
i t+∆Π   0.5556  0.8175  0.7350  0.1211  0.2517  0.4384  0.6461  0.4679  0.1793  0.0877* 
 0.5701  0.8112  0.2547  0.2667  0.8304 -0.2472 -0.0637 -0.0456  0.0777  0.0818 
, 4
effect
i t+∆Π   0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0840*  0.0669*  0.0000***  0.1461  0.7123  0.7918  0.6526  0.6304 
 0.3888  0.3361  0.2278 -0.0360 -0.0512 -0.2676  0.2903  0.1427  0.2360  0.1708 
, 5
effect
i t+∆Π   0.0210**  0.0484**  0.1882  0.8374  0.7702  0.1527  0.1197  0.4518  0.2094  0.3668 
 RIVALS 
 PROCOMPETITIVE ANTICOMPETITIVE 
 CAR(1,1) CAR(2,2) CAR(5,5) CAR(25,5) CAR(50,5) CAR(1,1) CAR(2,2) CAR(5,5) CAR(25,5) CAR(50,5) 
-0.2169  0.3314  0.0204  0.0085  0.1264 -0.1414 -0.1174 -0.1455  0.1444  0.2191 
, 1
effect
i t+∆Π   0.0032***  0.0000***  0.7842  0.9090  0.0899  0.0392  0.0860*  0.0334**  0.0348**  0.0013*** 
-0.1605 -0.1222  0.0271 -0.2188 -0.0413 -0.3162 -0.2211 -0.2676  0.3003  0.2045 
, 2
effect
i t+∆Π   0.0447**  0.1262  0.7365  0.0059***  0.6077  0.0001***  0.0055***  0.0008***  0.0002***  0.0104*** 
-0.2773  0.1216 -0.1338  0.0062  0.0402 -0.2000 -0.1353  0.0004  0.2199  0.1600 
, 3
effect
i t+∆Π   0.0027***  0.1953  0.1541  0.9478  0.6724  0.0408  0.1687  0.9971  0.0242**  0.1029 
-0.2204 -0.2841 -0.2379 -0.0742 -0.0837 -0.1369 -0.0598  0.1817  0.4032  0.1853 
, 4
effect
i t+∆Π   0.0328**  0.0055*  0.0210**  0.4770  0.4227  0.2318  0.6029  0.1113  0.0003***  0.1043 
 0.1696 -0.0355  0.3037  0.1482 -0.0266 -0.5945 -0.4058 -0.3331  0.6128  0.2933 
, 5
effect
i t+∆Π   0.1514  0.7656  0.0090***  0.2108  0.8234  0.0000***  0.0007***  0.0059***  0.0000***  0.0160** 
